SCOTT vs. SANDFORD.

The foregoing statement and exposition of the judgment of the
court, and of the opinions of Chief Justice Taney and his four concurring associates, will enable us to form a correct judgment,
whether the first question before the court was, whether this was a
case to which the judicial power of the United States extended, or,
in other words, whether it was a controversy between citizens of
different States, and depended on the question whether Scott was a
citizen of the State of Missouri, according to the constitution and
laws thereof. If that was the first question, and the court decided,
as the majority of the judges certainly did, and pronounced the
judgment of the court to be, that Scott was not a citizen of the
State of Missouri, and for that reason the courts of the United
States had not jurisdiction of the case, and ordered it to be dismissed; then a correct judgment can be formed, whether the judges
in the majority, having decided that this was not a case to which
the judicial power of the United States extended, had a right, or
could, with even the appearance of judicial propriety, go farther,
and express the opinions above stated.
Geneva, A. Y.
S. A. F.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Oio.
COOLIDGE AND DUBARROW VS. NICHOLAS G. CURTIS ET AL.
1. If the construction of a State statute has been settled by the decision of the
highest court of the State, the courts of the United States uniformly adopt such
construction.
2. In Ohio, a failing debtor may prefer creditors, by assignment or otherwise, if
done under circumstances which repel the inference of a fraudulent purpose.
3. The Supreme Court of that State have decided that the act of the 14th March,
1853, "declaring

the effect of assignments to trustees, in contemplation of

insolvency, and the statute of 1838, of the same import, do not affect assignments
or transfers made for the sole benefit of the assignees or transferrees; but if made
trustees for other parties, the statute applies, and the property is held for the
equal benefit of all the creditors.
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4. But no trust will be implied merely from the fact that an assignment or transfer
has been made by an insolvent debtor to indemnify a surety for such debtor, if
no more property has been assigned than was necessary for that purpose and the
facts warrant the presumption that nothing was designed but the bona fide indem
nity of the surety.
5. Although such surety may be liable to respond to the creditors not provided for,
for any surplus after paying the debts for which he was bound, he is not a trustee
within the contemplation of the statute referred to.

J.-The plaintiffs allege in their bill that the defendant
Nicholas G. Curtis, is indebted to them in the sum of $1,868, to
recover which a suit at law is now pending in this court, in which
certain property, claimed by other parties, has been attached as the
property of said Curtis. They also set forth that Curtis, in contemplation of insolvency, assigned and transferred to the defendants,
'Wilkinson Beatty, Joseph Curtis, Thomas Moore, and others, all
his property for the purpose of preferring creditors in Ohio, to the
exclusion of those residing in the eastern cities. The object of the
bill is to charge the persons just named as trustees of the property
transferred to them, for the benefit of all the creditors of Curtis *
and the prayer is, that a receiver may be appointed to take posseEsion of the property, and hold the same subject to the further order
of the court, and that, on the final -hearing, the proceeds may be
apportioned equally among all the creditors.
The defendants, in their answer, admit the insolvency of N. G.
Curtis, as averred in the bill, and allege that the sale or assignments of property or assets to them, was made in good faith to pay
or secure debts justly due them, and indemnify them for liabilities
incurred for said Curtis, by endorsements and other modes of suretyship. They deny any sale or assignment to them in trust, for the
benefit of any other creditor ; or that they received or hold property as trustees, either expressly or by legal intendment.
Referring to the bill, it will be seen the plaintiffs do not ask for
the cancelment of the alleged assignments or transfers as illegal
and void, on the ground of fraud; but they insist that they fall
within the operation of the statute of Ohio, passed the 14th of
March, 1853, "1declaring the effect of assignments to trustees, in
contemplation of insolvency;" and that they inure to the equal
L AVITT,
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benefit of all the creditors of Curtis. The important; question in
the case, therefore, is, whether the parties to whom the assignments
or transfers have been made by the debtor, are trustees within the
meaning of the statute referred to.
There are three separate transactions stated in the bill, and
insisted upon in the argument, as within the operation of the statute.
I will first notice the sale of the stock of goods by N. G-. Curtis to
Beatty. The answers of the defendants Curtis and Beatty, and
the evidence on file sufficiently show, that for several years prior to
the autumn of 1857, Curtis had been engaged in the dry goods
business, at Hamilton, in Butler county, Ohio. He had become
greatly embarrassed in his pecuniary affairs. His paper had been
protested and suits had been brought against him on claims which
he was unable to meet. His friends and others in the.community
regarded him as insolvent, and it was apparent be could not continue his business. He was in possession of a stock of dry goods,
nominally worth, at the invoice prices, about $31,000, and he had
notes and book accounts amounting to about $20,000, but available
for not more than half that sum. He had previously owned real
estate worth from $6,000 to $8,000, which had been mortgaged for
its entire value. His debts amounted to about $66,000, of which
$30,000 was due to persons residing in Butler county, and .36,000
to creditors in New York and Philadelphia. He was indebted to
Beatty in the sum of $4,453, and Beatty was liable for him, as
endorser and otherwise, in the sum of about $2,650. Beatty was
a citizen of Butler county, of large pecuniary means, and of respectable standing. On the 19th of November, 1857, after a good deal
of conference on the subject, Curtis agreed to sell his entire stock
to Beatty, and a written agreement of sale was executed by the
parties. This agreement purports in its terms to be an absolute
and unconditional sale of the goods. It provides, among other
things, that the goods shall be invoiced by three persons named
in the writing, and that Beatty shall pay for them at the rate of
sixty-six and two-third cents on the dollar, of the cost or invoice
prices. At the invoice prices the stock amounted to 831,000;
and at the rate agreed on, the sum to be paid by Beatty was
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about $20,666. He executed his notes for $16,666 66. These
notes, at the request of the counsel of Curtis, after the sale and
while the invoice was in progress, were given in sums to enable
Curtis to transfer them to creditors, in payment, or as collateral
security for debts. Though not stated in the written contract, it
was the understanding of the parties, that Beatty should have a
credit on the purchase to the amount of the debt due from Curtis;
and this arrangement was carried into effect in giving the notes.
It is in evidence that these notes were delivered to Curtis, and
by him transferred to creditors, in some cases as absolute payment, in others as collateral security.
In his answer, -which is sworn to, Beatty avers that the purchase of the goods by him was in good faith; that he paid the
full value for them; and that his sole object was to secure the
debt due him, and obtain indemnity as security; and that at the
time of the purchase, he had no knowledge of any intention by
Curtis to prefer a portion of his creditors.
It is, perhaps, not material to notice, that before the invoice of
the goods was completed, they were attached by process issued from
this court, as the property of Curtis, and subsequently taken from
the custody of the marshal by a writ of replevin from the Court of
Common Pleas of Butler county, and delivered to Beatty, who has
since sold the entire stock.
The transactions between N. G. Curtis and Joseph Curtis, referred to in the bill, are briefly these : prior to the sale to Beatty,
N. G. Curtis was indebted to Joseph Curtis, directly, by note and
book account, in the sum of $568. Joseph Curtis was liable, as
the indorser of N. G. Curtis, on paper held by the banking firm of
Shaffer, Curtis & Potter-of which Joseph Curtis was a partnerin the sum of about $12,471; and he was also liable as the
guarantor of other paper of N. G. Curtis, held by said banking
house, to the amount of $4,981 34; making an aggregate of
indebtedness and liability as surety, of $18,021. It also appears
Joseph Curtis was contingently liable for N. G. Curtis, as surety on
a bond to the treasurer of the school board of the city of Hamilton,
and also on other bonds given by him in a fiduciary character.
22
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Immediately after the sale to Beatty, N. G. Curtis transferred
several of the notes given for the goods, to Joseph Curtis. These
notes were payable at different times, from four months to three
years, and amounted to $7,000, but with the rebatement of interest
were worth only $6,640. In addition to this, N. G. Curtis assigned
to Joseph Curtis notes and book accounts amounting nominally to
$8,352, but worth not exceeding the half that sum. The parties
both swear that these transfers were made for the sole purpose
of securing Joseph Curtis, and without any purpose, express or
implied, that the latter was to hold the assets as a trustee, or for
the benefit of N. G. Curtis, or any creditor but himself.
In relation to the transfers to Thomas Moore, it appears that N.
Ox. Curtis was indebted to him directly, in the sum of $500, and
that Moore was liable as indorser for $1,718. Curtis transferred
to Moore one of Beatty's notes for $1,440, due in three years from
its date, without interest, and worth only $1,200, together with
sundry small accounts, of the nominal amount of $1,000, but really
not available for more than fifty per cent. of that sum. Curtis and
Moore state in their answers, that these transfers were in good faith,
and intended solely to indemnify Moore, and not in trust for any
purpose.
The bill also avers a transfer of a portion of his stock of goods
by N. G. Curtis to Levi S. Curtis. It will not be necessary to
notice this transaction or to decide whether fraud may not be
implied in connection with it. The sale has been annulled by the
parties, and it is in evidence that the goods have been delivered by
N. G. Curtis, in payment of bona fide debts.
The question arising on these facts is, whether the sale to Beatty,
and the transfers to Joseph Curtis and Thomas Moore, or any of
them, import assignments in trust to prefer creditors within the
meaning of the act of March, 1853.
The statute provides "that all assignments of property in trust,
which shall be made by debtors to trustees, in contemplation of
insolvency, with the design to prefer one or more creditors, to the
exclusion of others, shall be held to enure to the benefit of all the
creditors, in proportion to their respective demands; and such trusts
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shall be subject to the control of the courts, which may require
security of the trustees for the faithful execution of the trusts, or
remove them and appoint others, as justice may require."
A statute, identical in its terms with that just quoted, with one
unessential exception, was passed by the legislature of Ohio in 1838,
and was in force until the act of 1853 took effect. Under these
statutes a number of cases have been before the Supreme Court of
the State, and their purpose and meaning seem now to be well settled. In accordance with the approved and established practice of
the federal courts, affirmed by repeated decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, this court, in giving a construction to
the statute under consideration, will be guided by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the State. The cases which have arisen
under the statute, have been referred to in the argument of
counsel, and such of them as bear upon the question before the
court will be noticed.
Before referring to these cases, it may be remarked that, prior
to the passage of the act of 1838, declaring the effect of assignments in trust, by a failing debtor, to prefer creditors, it had been
held by the Supreme Court of the State that such debtor could
lawfully prefer a creditor, if the preference was in good faith, and
under circumstances repelling the presumption of a fraudulent
purpose; and since the enactment of that law, the validity of
such a preference has been affirmed, unless made 'through the
intervention of a trustee, in which case, under the statute, the
assignment is not void, but enures to the equal benefit of all the
creditors. It is, therefore, settled law in Ohio, that a debtor, in a
state of insolvency, may pay a creditor his entire debt, although
such payment may operate to the injury of other creditors; and
it can make no difference whether the payment is made in money
or in property. A debtor may also, indirectly, give preference to
a creditor by confessing a judgment, and thus enabling the creditor
to obtain a priority, by the levy of an execution on the property of
the debtor. It is equally clear that the debtor may dispose of his
property by an absolute sale, if no fraud is intended, and pay the
proceeds to some of his creditors, in exclusion of others. In these
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cases, in the contemplation of law, the creditor is entitled to the
benefits resulting from his diligence. It is not clear of doubt whether this right of preference, even with the limitation stated, can
be vindicated either on the basis of strict morality or commercial
expediency. Apro rata division of the proceeds of an insolvent
debtor's property among all his creditors, under all circumstances,
and an unconditional prohibition of all preferences from the actual
occurrence of insolvency, is more accordant with all our views of
justice and fair dealing. But the law on this subject is now too
firmly settled in Ohio, by the adjudications of her courts, to be
changed, except by positive legislative interposition.
In the case before the court, there is no reason to doubt that, in
the sale to Beatty, and in the transfer of assets to Joseph Curtis
and Thomas Moore, the debtor, with a knowledge of his insolvency,
designed to provide for creditors residing in Butler county, leaving
his eastern creditors to share pro rata whatever residuum there
might be. The evidence is clear that he made declarations before
the sale to Beatty, of such a purpose; and, especially, that he
intended to secure those who had become his sureties. Beatty, in
his answer, denies that, at the time he purchased the stock of goods,
he had any knowledge of Curtis' intention to prefer his home
creditors. It is not material to inquire, in the decision of the questions arising in this case, whether Beatty, or the other parties to
whom transfers or assignments were made, were cognizant of such
a purpose. If the insolvent debtor could lawfully sell or transfer
his property, intending to prefer certain creditors, the knowledge of
such intention, by the parties preferred, cannot affect the question
whether the transactions are within the operation of the statute.
The legal right to prefer a creditor, to whom the insolvent debter
is directly indebted, is not denied by the counsel for the plaintiffs,
but they insist, if property is assigned to indemnity against less as
a surety for such debtor, the assignee holds the property in trust
for the creditor for whom he is surety, and may be called on to
account in equity for the property assigned ; and, therefore, that
such assignment falls within the statute, by necessary implication.
In the case before the court, there is no claim that there was an
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express trust in the sale to Beatty, or in the other transfers made
by Curtis. If, therefore, a trust cari be predicated of the facts in
proof, it must be implied, and does not result from the patent acts
of the parties. And this presents the question, whether a trust can
be implied from the fact that the sale and transfers of property
were designed, in part, for the indemnity of sureties. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio uniformly sustain the principle
that, under the statute, an assignment or transfer of property, by a
failing debtor, intended to prefer certain creditors, is not within its
intention or scope, unless such preference is to be effected through
the agency of a trustee. But, in determining whether a trust is
created, within the meaning of the statute, that court holds that a
strict construction is not to be given to the assignment or transfer,
and that, without regard to form, the nature and character of the
transaction must have the controlling influence. Thus, in the case
of Holsrader et al. vs. Leiby et al., 4 Ohio State Rep. 602, the
court say, "After a very careful examination of the subject in all
its bearings, we are unanimously of the opinion that our statute
requires us to hold, that when any valuable interest of the insolvent
debtor is transferred by any species of conveyance, binding the recipient, either expressly or by necessary implication, to account in
chancery, to any creditor of the assignor, the statute enlarges the
trust, and makes it enure to the benefit of all his creditors, and
distributes the fund to all, in proportion to their respective demands." And in the same case the court say, "To bring a case
within the operation of the law, there must be a transfer or conveyance of property, or some valuable interest belonging to the
insolvent debtor, in view of his insolvency, to be held by the person
taking it, for the benefit of some one or more of the creditors of the
debtor, other than himself." The same principle has been substantially affirmed, in other cases, to which it is not necessary specially
to refer.
It is now proper to inquire, whether the several transactions,
under consideration in this case, or any of them, are within the
principle thus laid down by the Supreme Court of Ohio. And a
reference to the cases decided by that court leads to the conclusion,
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not only that a failing debtor may indemnify a surety by transferring property to him, but that guch a transfer does not raise a trust
by implication, or necessarily impose an obligation on the transferee,
to account to other creditors for the property transferred.
The case of Atkinson et al. vs. Tomlinson et al., 1 Ohio State
Rep. 237, seems to be in point on this question. In that case, an
insolvent debtor assigned his entire property to two persons, to indemnify them as sureties. The property so assigned was sold by
the sureties, and the proceeds were applied in payment of the debts
for which they were liable. Other creditors filed their bill, charging
fraud in the assignment, and praying for a pro rata distribution of
the proceeds of the property. The court held the assignment to be
valid. In the conclusion of their opinion they say, "Now, in the
present case, the defendants were the sureties of Tomlinson; they
took an assignment of about enough property to pay off their liabilities for him; and although they showed themselves very anxious
to obtain the security, as all men would, under similar circumstances,
yet securing themselves appears to have been their sole object; and
we think they had a legal right to do it."
In the case of Bloom vs. Nogle, 4 Ohio State Rep. 56, the court
say: "It has been fully settled by repeated decisions of this court,
that a creditor of an insolvent debtor, or one having assumed liabilities for him as surety, may lawfully take from him a mortgage
to secure such debt, or save harmlessfrom such liability, and as the
reward of his diligence, will be protected in the priority thus obtained ;" and in the case of Hokrader et al. vs. -eiby et al., before
cited, the court say: "The statute does not affect a mortgage given
by an insolvent debtor to secure the debt of one of his creditors, or
to indemnify him against a liability, by indorsement or otherwise,
assumed for the benefit of the debtor, although it may have the
effect to prefer such creditor."
From these and other cases that might be referred to, the principle seems well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of
'Ohio, that a mortgage or other transfer of property may be given
by a failing debtor, not only to secure a debt due by such debtor,
but also to indemnify a surety; and it is most obvious, that if the

COOLIDGE AND DUBARROW vs. CURTIS.

right to prefer a creditor has any foundation in justice, it should
be extended to the case of a surety. It is not only a popular principle, but one which accords with the most obvious dictates of honor,
that a surety of a failing debtor occupies a more meritorious position than any other creditor, and has a moral claim to indemnity
superior to that of one who has become a creditor in the ordinary
business transactions of life. Hence, it is an established maxim
that sureties are favorites with courts of equity.
It is insisted, however, by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that the
cases in the Supreme Court of Ohio, to which he refers, sustain the
doctrine of an implied trust in all cases where a conveyance or
transfer of property is made by an insolvent debtor, to indemnify a
surety, and that the surety is liable to account for the proceeds of
the property as a trustee; and, if so liable, the case comes within
the statute. The cases relied on do not seem to sustain this position to the extent claimed. In those cases the court adjudged the
conveyance or assignment to be within the statute, not because preferences were made to sureties, but because there was an express
trust for the benefit of some creditor other than the grantee or
assignee. Thus, in the case of Rokrader et al. vs. Leiby et al., the
mortgage was held to be an assignment in trust to prefer creditors,
because it was given for th6 benefit of persons who were not mortgagees, and that, as to them, there was a trust. The entire opinion
of the court leaves no doubt, that if the mortgage had been given
for the indemnity of the mortgagees only, as sureties of the debtor,
the transaction would not be brought within the operation of the
statute.
The case of Dixon et al. vs. Rawson et al., 5 Ohio State Rep.
224, is relied on as sustaining the implication of a trust in the sale
to Beatty, and the transfers to Joseph Curtis and Thomas Moore.
But in the case referred to, the insolvent debtors assigned their
property to some of their creditors, not only to secure them, but in
trust that another person not named as an assignee, a surety of the
debtor, should be indemnified for his liability. This was clearly atrust within the meaning of the statute; but there is no intimation
in the opinion of the court, that a trust would be implied if the
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assignment bad been solely for the benefit or security of the assignees. The judgment of the court was based on the fact that
there was an express trust in favor of a person who was not an
assignee. The court say, referring to the statute under consideration, "it does not in any way affect conveyances or mortgages made
by a failing debtor to his creditors for the purpose of paying or
securing his debts; but it does control every transfer or conveyance
of property, whether by mortgage or otherwise, made by an insolvent debtor, in view of his insolvency, to be held by the person
taking it for the benefit of some one or more of the creditors of the
debtor, to the exclusion of others. To bring the case within the
operation of the statute, the conveyance must be in trust, and the
person receiving the property thereby constituted a trustee for some
one or more of the creditors of the debtor, to the exclusion of
others." In this opinion of the court there is no intimation of a
doubt as to the correctness of the principles decided in previous
cases, involving the construction of the statute. It is, in fact, an
affirmance of the decisions in those cases, and the court refer to
them, by name, as "carefully considered cases."
The last case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, is that of Bagely
et al.vs. Waters et al., 7 Ohio State Rep. 359. The material facts
were, that a merchant, in failing circumstances, sold and transferred
his stock of goods, notes, and book accounts, and also his real
estate, amounting to about $30,000, being the principal part of his
property, to a person who, with others, was liable for him to the
amount of about $20,000, and -who assumed the payment of the
debts for which he was liable as surety, and also other debts which
were specified in the written agreement between the parties. The
creditors, not provided for in this arrangement, brought suit to
charge the assignee, as a trustee, under the act of 1853.
The Supreme Court held that the statute does not prohibit a failing debtor from applying his property or means to the payment in
full of a part of 'his creditors, though nothing should be left for
others equally meritorious. They say, "the sole object of the
statute is to prevent his effecting this purpose by an assignment in
trust ;" and they hold, as there was no proof in conflict with the
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conclusion, that the agreement was what it purports to be, an absolute and unconditional sale of the property, in consideration of the
promise of the vendee to pay certain debts, for a part of which he
was surety, no trust to prefer creditors could be implied, and that
the assignment was not within the statute.
The case just referred to, in some of its aspects, is similar to that
before the court, and would seem to be conclusive on the question
now to be decided. The assignment in that case was made for the
sole purpose of indemnifying a surety, who, it would seem, in addition to his legal liability to pay the debts, as surety, had expressly
assumed their payment. The court held, that although the assignee
thus made himself responsible for those debts to the creditors, and
would be bound to apply the proceeds of the property assigned or
sold for that purpose, it was not an assignment in trust, as contemplated by the statute.
The facts in relation to the several transactions charged in the
bill, as within the act of 1853, have been already stated. As to the
stock of goods, the evidence leaves no room for a doubt, that there
was a positive, unconditional sale to Beatty, exclusively for his
benefit and indemnity as a creditor of and a surety for Curtis. The
goods were sold at their full value -in the opinion of several witnesses, for more than they were worth-and the notes given for the
purchase were transferred by Curtis, with the knowledge and consent of Beatty, to creditors, either in actual payment of debts, or
as collateral security. It is a fact, not controverted, that Beatty
has the ability to pay, and, without doubt, will promptly pay these
notes, as they mature. It would seem clear, under the authorities
that have been cited, that Curtis had the legal right to sell this
property, with the purpose of preferring certain creditors, and that
Beatty, with a view to his own security, had a right to purchase.
In paying for the goods, he retained so much as was deemed necessary to pay the debt due from Curtis; and it was also a part of the
arrangement, that he should be indemnified to the extent of his
suretyship for him. It would seem, however, from the evidence,
that the difference between the value of the goods as appraised, and
the notes given by Beatty, was something less than the actual in-
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debtedness of Curtis to him; and hence there is no ground for an
inference that there can be a residuum in his hands, for which he
can be held liable to account to the creditors who are not provided
for. There is, therefore, nothing in this transaction from which a
trust can be implied, within the contemplation of the statute, or
which can be a basis for a proceeding in equity, to charge Beatty
as an assignee.
In reference to the transfers to Joseph Curtis and Thomas Moore,
it would seem clear, that within the principles of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, they also are protected from the operation
of the act of 1853. They were separately creditors of the insolvent
debtor, and they were liable for him, as sureties. To pay the debts
due them, and as an indemnity for their suretyship, notes and other
assets were assigned to them respectively, less in amount in both
cases, than the sums for which they were liable. There is no evidence contradicting or disproving the allegations of their answers,
that their sole object, in this arrangement, was to protect themselves
from their liability, and both deny that there was any other purpose
in view.
To bring an assignment within the operation of the statute, there
must be, in the words of the statute, "a design to prefer one or
more creditors to the exclusion of others ;" and this purpose must
be accomplished through the agency of a trustee. It is true, as
already stated, that the insolvent Curtis intended to prefer some of
his creditors, but such intention does not bring the transactions
within the statute. The pertinent inquiry is, has he assigned property in trust for this purpose. In the case of Bagely et al. vs.
Waters et al., before noticed, the court, in reference to the cases
that had been before the court, involving the construction of the
statute, say: "In each of them that has not been overruled, the
instrument which was held to be an assignment in trust, gave to
other creditors, beside the assignees, or reserved for the assignor, an
interest in the property transferred, or in its proceeds, and thus
laid the foundation for chancery jurisdiction, to compel an account."
And again: "In each of them, it will be found that the assignee
held the property as mortgagee, or, otherwise, in part, at least,
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merely to secure other creditors beside himself, or was to account
for a residuum to the assignor. Such instruments might well be
declared assignments in trust." And in the case of .Doremus et al.
vs. O'Harraet al., 1 Ohio State Rep. 45, the court held, that "the
statute of 1838, relating to assignments of the property of a failing
debtor for the purpose of preferring creditors, does not embrace all
cases of assignments made by such debtor, but refers only to those
cases where the assignee stands in the character of a trustee, other
than his merely receiving a conveyance to secure his own claim."
These authorities seem clearly to warrant the conclusion that no
one of the several transactions in question in this case falls within
the statute. In the sale to Beatty, and the transfers to Joseph
Curtis and Thomas Moore, no trust can be implied in favor of any
creditors other than the vendee or the transferees. The cases referred to establish the doctrine that, to the extent of their liability
as sureties, they had a legal right to obtain indemnity by any species of assignment or transfer, which, in its benefits, was limited to
them, and made no provision for a preference in behalf of any other
creditor. This right being conceded, they cannot be viewed as
trustees under the statute. As sureties, the legal obligation to pay
the creditors, to whom they stood in that relation, upon the failure
or inability of their principal to make payment, was complete, and
could not be affected by any assignment for their indemnity. The
debtor was hopelessly insolvent; and their liability to pay the debts
for which they were surety, rested upon no contingency. Their
entire property-not only that assigned to them, but all they then
owned, or might subsequently acquire-was liable for the payment
of these debts. These considerations, in connection with the fact
that no more property was placed in their hands than was necessary
for their indemnity, strongly negative the existence of an implied
trust, and repel the conclusion that they are chargeable, in equity
or otherwise, as trustees under the statute. It may be conceded
that if, after applying the proceeds of the property transferred to
the sureties, there should be a surplus in their hands, the creditors
not paid or provided for, would be entitled to the benefit of such
surplus. But their claim would not rest on the basis of an assign-
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ment in trust to prefer creditors, within the meaning of the statute,
but upon the legal and equitable principle that one who holds money
to which another is entitled, may be sued for its recovery. In the
case of Atkinson et al. vs. Tomlinson, 1 Ohio State Rep. 243, the
court decide that a liability to account for a surplus, where property
has been assigned or conveyed by a failing debtor, to pay a debt or
indemnify a surety, does not, necessarily, raise a trust, within the
scope and meaning of the statute. In illustration of the views of
the Supreme Court on this point, they refer to the case of a mortgage given by such debtor, and remark, in these words: "Now, it
may be said, that a mortgagee is, in some respects, a trustee; but
this arises merely as an incident to his relation as mortgagee, and
is not the kind of trustee designated in the statute."
The views thus indicated relieve the court from the necessity of
expressing an opinion on the point made by the counsel for defendants, that a decree cannot be rendered for the plaintiff, for the reason that all the parties in interest are not before the court. For
the same reason, it is unnecessary to decide whether the proceedings in replevin in reference to the goods purchased by Beatty, are
an estoppel to the plaintiffs to the assertion of the claim set up in
this bill.
Bill dismissed.
Worthington &. Mathews and Thompson & .Nesmith, for plaintiff;
Fox & Fox, James Clark and T. Miliken, for defendants.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,March, 1859.
JOHN B. POWELL VS.

THE PENNSYLVANIA

RAILROAD COMPANY.

1. Where a common carrier of live stock, as horses, permits a shipper to put straw
into a car, although the company's agent told the shippers that if straw was
used it must be at the shipper's own risk, and the shipper has signed a release
from all claims for damage to live stock while in the company's cars, and the
straw is fired and damage ensues to the animal, this is negligence, and the car-

rier is liable on his contract.
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2. When the Court was requested to charge under the above facts, that if there
was liability to fire from the locomotive, it was negligence for the carrier to permit straw, which is a combustible material, to be used in the car, and if the jury
find that the fire originated from that cause, the carrier is liable, it is error to
refuse so to charge.-Per WOODWARD, P.

Error to the District Court, Philadelphia. The opinion of the
Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-Whoever has been attentive to the course of decisions in this court for the last few years, in questions between
railroad companies and those whom they have injured in person or
property,. cannot have failed to observe that on the one hand we
accept no excuse from the party who obstructs the track or interferes with the transportation of the company; and on the other,
that we hold companies bound to transport safely, or to respond in
damages, except where the injury has resulted from the act of God
or the concurring negligence of the party complaining.
Brie Railroad vs. Skinner, 7 Harris 298, 1 Am. Law Reg. 97;
Little S,huyflkill Railroadvs. Norton, 12 Harris 465, 466, and
O'Brien vs. The -Phila.Wilmington and Baltimore R. B. Co., 6
Am. Law Reg. 861, are instances of ruling upon the first branch
of the alternative, whilst there are many cases that belong to the
second branch. Coldey vs. the Penn. R. R. Co., 6 Casey 242;
Sullivan vs. The Phil. ,4 Read. B. R. Co., ib. 234; Reeves vs.
he Del. & Lack. R. R. Co., ib. 454.
The ground of these adjudications is that railroads, though in
some sense public highways, like turnpike roads, are committed by
law to the management and control of corporations, who are bound
to employ all necessary officers and agents, and to instruct them in
their respective duties, 6o as to secure to the public a safe transportation. The public, while entitled without distinction to travel
upon railroads, are entitled to do so only in a particular manner, in
vehicles controlled and managed by the company, and of the control and management of which, it would seem, the company are not
allowed to divest themselves, even for the purpose of giving them
up to another company. Angell's Law of Highways, § 370; and
Beman vs. Rufford, 6 Eng. Law and Eq. R., 106.
And this control and management of the cars extends to every
part of the.service-the receiving and discharging of passengers,

POWELL vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

and the loading and unloading of freight, as well as to the making
up of trains and conducting them over the road. In Beeves vs. the
Del., Lack. & Western B. R. Co., 6 Casey 464, it was said the
company are bound to employ all necessary agents, to instruct them
in their duties, and to look to them for the performance of every
act which the business of the road requires.
These principles are not more necessary for the safety of the public than for the prosperity of railroad companies. If every man
were permitted to occupy and use the tracks of railroads according
to his own fancy or interests-or to dictate how cars should be
loaded and arranged in the train, confusion and disaster, involving
loss of life and injury to person and property, would ensue as inevitable consequences. The agents in charge at shipping points are
presumed to know better than freighters or drovers, how many dumb
beasts ought to be put into a car, and what arrangements are necessary to be made for their comfort and safety; and it is due, alike
to the animals and the owners, that the skill and experience of the
agents should dictate every thing that pertains to the taking on,
the carrying and discharge of the load. Ritz vs. Penn.B. B. Co.,
15 Leg. Int. 75.
With these principles before us, let us look at the case upon the
record. The plaintiff applied to the company's shipping agent, at
Pittsburg, for the transportation of a young and valuable mare to
Philadelphia. Two witnesses swear that the plaintiff asked for tan
for bedding for the mare, and that the agent told him he could not
get tan, but said he could get plenty of straw, and directed him
where straw was kept for sale. The straw was obtained and put
into the car, in the presence and without objection from the agent.
On the way it took fire, by sparks from the engine, and burned the
mare, if not to death, so badly as greatly to impair her value.
The agent swears that the company have a positive rule that
shippers are not to use straw except at their own risk. He does
not recollect the conversation sworn to by other witnesses; but that
he "must have said that if they used straw it would be at their
own risk."
The plaintiff signed a release of the company from any and all
claims for damages or injury to his stock while in the company's cars.
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'Upon these facts the plaintiff's counsel requested the Court to
charge that, if there was liability to fire from the locomotive, it was
negligence for the company to permit straw or other combustible
materials to be used in the cars, and if the jury find the fire originated from that cause, the company are liable.
The refusal of the court to affirm this proposition is the only
error assigned.
The ruling of the learned judge cannot be justified on the ground
of the release signed by the plaintiff, because that has b6en held to
be no excuse for negligence. See &oldey vs. the Penn. B. B. Co.,
6 Casey 242, and other cases therein cited.
Was it negligence, then, to permit straw to be used ? The result
proves that it was. The plaintiff's point was dependent on the contingency that the fire originated from that cause-the use of the
straw-and as the court refused to submit this question, we must
presume it would have been found as the plaintiff assumed the facts
to be.
A fire resulting from the use of straw proves it also. The agent
swears to the rule, but he brings home no notice of it to the plaintiff, except by his argumentative conclusions that he "must have
said if they used straw, it would be at their own risk."
So far from this conclusion being accurate, the testimony of the
other witness shows that the agent encouraged the plaintiff to obtain straw, and permitted him to use it without any proclamation
of the rule that forbade it.
The existence of such a rule is evidence that the experience of
the company had established the danger of using straw for bedding.
And yet this agent stood by and suffered straw to be used without
disclosing the danger or pleading the rule, and thereby subjected
the mare to the awful tortures described in the evidence, and the
plaintiff to the loss of which he complains.
Such is this case upon the record. It was a case of flagrant
negligence. For what is the company's agent there, but to prescribe the bedding for animals shipped on board of their cars, as
well as to superintend all the preparations for the trip ? The cars
are theirs-under their exclusive control, and they are bound to see
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that they are road-worthy in all respects. A defective wheel, or
axle, or frame-work, would confessedly render them liable, even as
against the release. The carrying of a combustible article so near
the engine as to be exposed to sparks, was even more inexcusable,
for this could not escape observation, as defects in the vehicle might.
To attend to nine things, and neglect the tenth, was to be guilty of
the whole law. They were to take every precaution which prudence, diligence, and experience could reasonably suggest. It was
for this the law gave them their charter, and their right to be public transporter3. Their business will became a snare for the unwary, and an intolerable nuisance in the community, if they be not
held to the conditions they have assumed. If they-may perform
part of their duties and turn over the rest to be performed by ignorance and inexperience, disasters will become almost as frequent
as trips. And when it is considered that the company itself generally suffers as much loss by each disaster as those whom it injures,
it is obvious that the best interests of the company, as well as of the
public, demand a strict observance of the rules and principles of
law that are applicable to their business.
We are of opinion that, upon the facts presented, the plaintiff's
point should have been affirmed.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire de nova awarded.

1n the Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY VS. FRANKLIN MOORE AND
OTHERS.
1. Whether, in a particular case, a merchant in New York, shipping goods to his
correspondent in the interior, had authority to make a contract on behalf of the
correspondent for shipment, on different terms from those ordinarily adopted by
common carriers, is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury upon the
evidence; and the court cannot, properly, be asked to make any charge that
shall absolutely dispose of the fact in controversy.
2. Although it devolves upon a common carrier to show affirmntively the terms of
any contract which lessens his common law liability, yet that fact is to be proved,
like any o, her, by any pertinent evidence. If in writing, the writing must be
shown; bat, if by parol, there is no rule which requires different proof from
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that which would establish any other contract. The jury must be satisfied, from
the evidence, that a certain contract exists; and, if satisfied, that is sufficient.
3. Where the court is asked to, and does, charge the jury as to the conclusive
nature of a written contract between the parties, if they shall find such contract
established by the evidence, and there is no proof in the case showing, or tending to show, a written contract of the kind mentioned in the charge, such charge
is improper, as tending to mislead the jury.
4. The navigation of the great American lakes, and their connecting waters, is not
"Inland Navigation" within the meaning of the Act of Congress entitled "An
Act to limit the liability of ship-owners, and for other purposes," approved
March 3d, 1851. And, therefore, where goods were entrusted to a common carrier, to be transported from New York to Detroit, by way of Lake Erie and
the Detroit River, and while upon the steamboat of the carrier, in the harbor of
Buffalo, in the course of transit, were destroyed by fire, without any negligence
or fault on the part of the carrier or his agents, the carrier is not liable to the
owner for the loss.

Error to Wayne Circuit.
The plaintiff in error was sued by the defendants in error, in an
action of assumpsit, for the non-delivery of certain goods entrusted
to the plaintiff in error, in New York, to be transported to the
defendants in error, in Detroit, by way of Buffalo and Lake Erie.
The evidence shows the following facts:
The plaintiff in error was a common carrier, having its business
office in New York, and engaged in transporting goods for hire
from New York to the western cities, by way of Hudson River, the
Erie Canal, and the Lakes. Prior to shipping any goods, Mr.
Foote, one of the defendants in error, called at the office of the
plaintiff in error, in New York, to ascertain the terms upon which
he could get his goods transported, and had an interview with one
Caldwell, an agent of the company. Caldwell, in reply to Foote's
inquiry, filled out a blank printed form of contract used by the
company, and exhibited it to Foote, as containing the terms upon.
which the company would transport his goods. This contract
bound the company to carry all goods offered, and fixed the rate of*
transportation at 40 cents per 100 lbs. for heavy goods, and 46
cents per 100 lbs. for light goods, to the end of the season, "1subject
to any advance of lake freights" after a certain date; and the
shipper bound himself to deliver all goods he would have for trans23
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portation to the end of the season ; and, in consideration that the
rates of freight therein fixed were one dollar per ton less than was
charged in the absence of such special contract, the shipper agreed
to exempt the company from loss and damage to all goods insured,
dangers of navigation on the lakes and rivers, damage by collision
and fires, ft.
Foote examined the paper, and objected to the clause providing
for an advance of lake freights, and also to the classification of
"Cnuts" as light goods: Caldwell consented to amend the contract
in those particulars. Foote then objected to those clauses which
exempted the company from liability for loss, &c., by the dangers
of lake navigation, by collision and fires, and on goods insured.
Caldwell declined to alter the contract in those respects; explained
their object to Foote, and told him that the company "would not
make any variation from the printed form of contract, except in
the two matters already stated ;" and Oaldwell testified that he
never agreed to waive any other provision, or gave Foote to understand that he would. Foote refused to sign the contract, but
informed Caldwell that he would ship some of his goods by the
company's line, and then Caldwell agreed to carry what goods he
should ship, at the same rates (40 and 45 cents), subject to no
advance of lake freights, and classing nuts as heavy. Caldwell, at
Foote's request, gave a written memorandum to that effect; which
memorandum, Caldwell testifies, "had reference to the rate of
freight, and nothing else." Afterwards, Foote directed the merchants of whom he bought his goods, to forward them by the company's lines, and they did so.
On the delivery of the goods by the respective merchants to the
company's agent, for shipment, receipts, or bills of lading, were
given for different portions of the goods, in two different forms:
The first form was a simple receipt, acknowledging the delivery of
the goods, by the merchants, in good order, and setting forth the
mark and destination, viz., to the plaintiffs below, at Detroit. These
receipts were not signed by the company's agent, but stamped with
the words "Receipt given at 64 Pearl street," which was the business office of the company; and no application was ever made at
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that office for any other receipt or bill of lading. For all the other
goods similar stamped receipts were given, but those papers were
taken by the respective shippers, to the office, and there exchanged
for receipts, or, more properly, bills of lading, in the following form:

They acknowledged the receipt of the goods from the merchants, in
good order, "to be forwarded to the lake port of Detroit, the loss
or damage from the dangers of lake and river navigatiion, collision
and fire, at the risk of the owner of the goods."

It was admitted on the trial, that these goods, while in the course
of transit to Detroit, were shipped on board the steamboat Al B.
Spaulding, one of the company's boats, at Buffalo, to be carried by

way of Lake Erie and Detroit River, to Detroit; that, while lying
in the port of Buffalo, a fire broke out on board the steamboat,
which destroyed the boat itself and all these goods, and that the
fire arose from some unknown cause (probably spontaneous combustion), without any negligence or fault on the part of the company or its agents.

The defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury as
follows :
1. If the jury shall believe that Foote and Caldwell made a special contract, yet, if the merchants who shipped the goods afterwards accepted bills of lading varying that contract, such subsequent

action binds the plaintiffs, and is a new contract by the plaintiffs'
agents.
2. That if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiffs
directed the merchants in New York, of whom they bought the
goods, to forward them by the defendant's line, and the merchants
did so, and, on delivery. of the goods to defendant's agent, accepted
bills of lading, or shipping receipts therefor, containing a clause
exempting the defendant from risks of fire, then their acceptance
binds the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs cannot recover for any goods
included in such bills of lading, or receipts.
3.If the jury believe, from the evidence, that in the contract
between Caldwell and Foote, no positive provision was made as to
risks, and that the contract was silent on that point, then the subsequent delivery, on the receipt of the goods, of bills of lading, or
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shipping receipts, containing a clause exempting the defendant
from the risk of fire, and the acceptance of such receipts, or bills
of lading, by the merchants who sold and shipped the goods to
plaintiffs, was a contract binding upon the plaintiffs.
4. That if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiffs'
goods were on board the propeller M. B. Spaulding, and were
destroyed by means of a fire happening on board said vessel, without any default of the defendant, and that the propeller was owned
by the defendant, and was used principally in navigating between
the cities of Buffalo and Detroit, by the way of Lake Erie, then
such propeller was not used in river or inland navigation, and the
defendant is exempted from liability for said goods, by virtue of
the provisions of the first clause of the first section of the Act of
Congress, approved March 3d, 1851, entitled "An Act to limit
the liability of ship-owners, and for other purposes."
Which instructions the court refused to give; to which refusal
the defendant excepted.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs requested the court to instruct the jury,
as follows :
1. The general liability of the carrier, independent of any special agreement, renders him chargeable as an insurer of the goods,
and accountable for any loss or damage that may happen to them
in the course of the conveyance, unless arising from the act of God
or the public enemy.
2. The burden of proof lies on the carrier; and nothing short of
an express stipulation, by parol or in writing, -will discharge him
from the duties the law imposes. The exemption from these duties
cannot depend upon any implication or inference founded on
doubtful and conflicting evidence, but must be specific and certain,
leaving no room for controversy between the parties.
3. That if the jury find that the contract between the parties
was reduced to writing, and is embodied in the entry on the card
and the entry on the defendant's books, then that the conversation
of the parties in relation thereto, preceding the making of the contract and at the time thereof, cannot be received to contradict or to
vary the same.
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4. That the Act of Congress of 1851 has no applicability to the
case, inasmuch as the "Spaulding" was engaged in inland navigation.
5. That the rule of damages is the value of the goods at the
place of destination.
The Circuit Judge charged substantially as requested by plaintiffs; and the defendant having excepted to the charge, the case,
after verdict and judgment for plaintiffs for the value of the goods,
was brought to this court by writ of error accompanied by bill of
exceptions: when the following opinion was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The errors assigned in this case arise upon the
action of the court below, in charging and in refusing to charge.
The requests made by the defendant below (who is plaintiff in
error), numbered one, two, and three, were properly refused by the
court.
Whether the merchants in New York, shipping goods to Moore,
Foote & Co., had authority to make contracts for shipment on different terms from those ordinarily adopted by common carriers,
was a question of fact; and the court could not properly be asked
to make any charge which should absolutely dispose of a fact in
controversy. The whole depended on the terms of agency.
We think the second instruction asked by the plaintiffs below,
and given by the court, is too broad and unqualified, and would
naturally tend to mislead a jury. It was taken literally from the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of the
New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. vs. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.
844. But as it appears there, it is considerably qualified by the
context. And it was not propounded there as an independent
abstract legal proposition, requiring no explanation. While it is
true that it devolves upon a carrier to show affirmatively the terms
of any contract which lessens his common law liability, yet that
fact is to be proved like any other, by any pertinent evidence. If
in writing, the writing must be shown; but if by parol, there is no
rule which requires different proof from that which would establish
any other contract. It does not matter that the evidence is conflicting, for in civil cases the jury must always decide upon the
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weight of evidence; and there is no rule (except where turpitude
or illegality is in issue) which requires one contract to be proven
by more or different testimony than another. The jury, in each
case, must be satisfied that a certain contract exists ; and, if satisfied, that is sufficient. In Walker vs. The York and North Midland B. V. Co., 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 315, where a plaintiff had been
notified that a company would not be responsible for certain risks,
and objected to the notice, and claimed that it was not binding on
him, and subsequently forwarded goods by the line, it was held
that it was proper to instruct a jury that they might infer an
agreement on the part of the plaintiff to such terms, unless a clear
refusal on his part was shown, and also an acquiescence by the
company in such refusal. This case is cited with approbation, and
given as an example, in a very able essay on the theory of implied
contracts, reprinted from the London Law Magazine in 4 American
Law Register, 321.
We also think the third instruction given was erroneous. The
unsigned memorandum was no contract in any sense of the term,
and could only be made available as embodied by reference in some
written or parol agreement which should adopt it. We think there
was nothing in the case to found any such charge upon. There
ivas no evidence showing, or tending to show, a written contract of
the kind mentioned in that charge, and the charge was, therefore,
improper, as tending to mislead the jury.-Toulmin vs. Beadley,
2 C. & K. 157.
The principal controversy in this case, and one -which goes to
the entire merits, is that raised by the fourth request of the defendant below, touching the character of lake navigation, within the
purview of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act to limit the liability of ship-owners, and for other purposes," approved March 3d,
1851.-9 Stat. U. S. 635. It is claimed by the plaintiff in error
that the owners of vessels thus employed are not liable for losses
on board by fire occurring without fault or negligence ; while the
defendants in error insist that such vessels come within the exceptions to the statute, and are, in the eye of the law, engaged in
"inland navigation."
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The first section of the act exempts the owners "1of any ship or
vessel" from liability for loss or damage to goods shipped, by
reason of any fire happening on board without the design or neglect
of the owners, with a proviso allowing the parties to make such
special contracts as they may see fit. The second section exempts
the master and owners from any liability for certain valuable articles, when not made known and entered on the bill of lading truly;
and in all cases limits the liability for such goods to the entered
valuation. The third section limits the liability of any owner for
any occurrence happening without his privity or knowledge, to the
value of his interest in the ship and freight. The fourth section
provides a method of equitable apportionment, where the value of
the ship and freight falls short of the losses. The fifth section
makes the charterers owners during the charter, for the purposes of
the act. The sixth section saves all remedies against master and
crew. The seventh section contains a penalty for shipping certain
inflammable and explosive articles in a general freight ship, without
a written note of the articles shipped. The latter clause of that
section-which is, in fact, a separate section-is as follows: " This
Act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, barge,
or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in
rivers or inland navigation."
The question raised here is one which has never been passed upon
by any court of last resort in this country, so far as we have been
informed; and its importance demands a very careful examination.
We propose, therefore, to view it in the light of the old law, and of
the maritime legislation of England, from which the statute in
question was substantially, and, in most respects, literally derived.
The policy of England has long been to aid and encourage navigation. But, so far as the liabilities of ship-owners, as carriers,
were concerned, they were left generally to be regulated by the bills
of lading. From the earliest times these have exempted vessels,
not only on account of the act of God or of the public enemy, but
from all losses arising from perils of the seas-abroad and comprehensive phrase, covering most casualties not attributable to negligence of some kind in the officers or crew. Although, in some
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early authorities, it is clearly intimated that fire is not a peril of
the seas, yet, as no case arose calling for the application of the
doctrine, it seems to have been lost sight of for a long time. In
1785, the first reported decision occurred, holding inland carriers
liable for loss by fire.-Forwardvs. Pittard,1 T. R. 86. In 1786,
in consequence of that decision, the statute 26 Geo. III., Chap. 86,
was passed, whereby the owners of any ship or vessel were exempted
from liability for loss by fire happening on board of the vessel, and
their other liabilities were limited. This statute exempted no one
but the owners from the particular liability; and it has been customary to exempt the master or charterers in such cases by the bill
of lading. By the statute 53 Geo. III., Chap. 159, certain other
qualified exemptions were made (not referring to fire, however);
and this last act was, by its terms, not to extend to "the owners
of any lighter, barge, boat or vessel, of any burden or description
whatsoever, used solely in rivers or inland navigation, or any ship
or vessel not duly registered according to law." It had been
decided already that the previous act did not apply to lighters.HTunter vs. McGowan, 1 Bligh, 573. It was also intimated in the
case of The Dundee, I Hagg. 113, that foreign vessels were not
within these acts, which were passed for the benefit of British
commerce. The same principle was affirmed in The Girolamo, 3
Hagg. 187, and The Carl Johann, cited in the latter case. By 6
and 7 Win. IV., Chap. 61, the provisions of these acts, and of 7 Geo.
IL, Chap. 15 (which was an earlier act, tending in the same direction), were declared to extend to Ireland. The object of all this
legislation is said, in Gale vs. Laurie, 5 B. & C. 156, to be "to
encourage persons to become owners of ships."
Holland had, at an earlier day, passed similar laws for the same
purpose. And by the Marine Ordinances of France, Book IL Title
IV., Art. 2, it was provided as follows: "The owners of ships shall
be answerable for the deeds of the master; but shall be discharged,
abandoning their ship and freight;" in this respect conforming
entirely to the English statutes and the act of Congress, in all cases
except fire-if, indeed, that is an exception; and such is the general
maritime law of Europe.-3 Kent Com. 217, 218.
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It is worthy of remark, that, while by the English and American
statutes, a liability to the extent of his interest in the vessel and
freight is retained against the owner in all other cases where there
was a common law liability, the exemption against fire is absolute
and entire. But while collusion might exist in other cases, fire on
shipboard could very rarely occur designedly; and, inasmuch as the
maritime law requires goods generally to be stowed below deck, the
vessel would commonly be destroyed by any fire which destroyed
her cargo, while, in other cases, where damage occurs not within the
legal exemptions, the vessel may, and usually does, remain undestroyed. There was no liability for fire without negligence, by the
civil law. Hunt vs. Morris, 6 Mart. La. 676.
It can require but a very slight comparison between our statute
of 1851 and the English acts, to ascertain that it was copied from
them. The general tenor is the same, and our law is referred to
this origin by Curtis J. in The Manufacturing Co. vs. Bark Tangier, Am. Law Reg. for June, 1858, Vol. 6, p. 504, where an action
was brought for goods burned. The peculiar term "rivers or inland
navigation," which led to some discussion before us in this case, and
which Judge Conkling in 1 Adm. Juris. 209, supposes to have been a
clerical mistake, is adopted literally from the act of 53 Geo. III.,
above referred to. Sofar, therefore, as English authorities bear upon
the subject under consideration, they are worthy of attention. The
same craft specifically exempted under 53 Geo. III., are exempted
by name in our statute, which contains no more extensive designation of particular vessels. Some of the English pilot and river acts,
containing similar designations, have passed under the observation
of the courts, and may also be examined with profit.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the English legislation, that
the intent of the acts referred to was to strengthen their commercial
marine, by encouraging persons to invest their capital without the
risk of ruin from those casualties which no ordinary care on their
part could prevent. Every owner could not be a master or mariner,
and self-interest would always prompt ship-owners to select reliable
officers and crews. There was great injustice in holding the innocent owner for matters entirely beyond his control. While, there-
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fore, the master was still left, in most cases, liable as at common
law, the owner was made exempt. But the reasons which made
such a relaxation necessary or expedient in the case of vessels
engaged in maritime commerce, did not apply with so much force
to the excepted list. The classes named in the exception are all
small vessels of burden, incapable from their nature of withstanding
the perils of the sea, and never in fact exposed to them. They are
not required to be navigated by expert seamen, and are never, or
but rarely, beyond the reach of their owners, or of succor in peril.
It will be found that in the English courts, for these and other
reasons, acts have been repeatedly construed with reference to one
class or the other by the character of the service, or the class of
vessels designated, where the general terms used in addition would,
in the popular sense, or with another context, embrace both classes.
The case of Hunter vs. M1eGowan, already referred to, held that
the act of 26 Geo. III. was inapplicable to lighters, although the
terms used were "any ship or vessel." But, not only was the term
"ship" the governing phrase, from which a fair intent might be
drawn that "vessel" meant something of kindred employment, but
the act referring to bills of lading, masters, mariners, and shippers,
and providing for an apportionment of loss in certain cases in a
court of equity, the inference would be almost irresistible that it
had reference to maritime business, because all the phrases are
maritime. The original report of this case is not at our command,
but it is frequently cited, and evidently went upon this ground.
In Blanford vs. Morrison, 15 Q. B. 724, under an act which required a certain ticket or certificate for all coal delivered in London
"liby any lighter, vessel, barge or other craft," it was held that a
coal-brig, which brought coal coastwise from Newcastle, and delivered it at the wharf, was exempt from the penalty of the law,
which was held merely to apply to such vessels as were used to
unload coal from others for delivery, and did not apply to vessels
in which it was originally shipped. The discussion is quite full and
instructive. In Benyonr vs. Creswell, 12 Q. 13. 899, it was held
that a vessel under fifteen tons burden could not be registered, and
that the registry was void. It had been registered; and the law
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required every transfer of property in a registered ship or vessel to
be by a bill of sale reciting the registry. No ship was by law to
be deemed a British ship without registry, but British built boats
and vessels under fifteen tons, owned and navigated by British
subjects, were to be admitted to be British in all navigation "in the
rivers and upon the coasts of the United Kingdom." The court
held that no vessel under fifteen tons could be registered at all. In
Regina vs. Reed, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 133, it was decided that an
act forbidding any person, not a freeman, to "act as a waterman
or lighterman, or navigate upon the river Thames between Windsor
and Gantlet creek, any wherry, lighter or other craft," did not
extend to a steam-tug; although by Tisdale vs. Combe, 7 Ad. &E.
-788, acts with a different wording, had been made applicable to
passenger and freight river-steamers on the Thames. The case of
Reed vs. Ingham, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 164, holds the same doctrine!
with Regina vs. Reed, deciding that the general words must be
confined to vessels ejusdem generis with those named, and that a
steam-tug requires different and greater skill to manage it in its
occupation, from that required for wherries, lighters, or similar
craft.
These cases all tend to show that such statutes, when mentioning
expressly certain classes of vessels, and then using general words,
intend to apply the latter to vessels ejusdem generis, either of build
or business, and not to extend the language beyond.
Besides the well understood meaning of "inland navigation" in
England, and the natural inference to be drawn from the use of the
vessels particularly named under the rules laid down in t6e cases
cited, some light may be derived from the course of the English
courts in dealing with kindred maritime questions, not immediately
applicable to these statutes, so far as the exceptions are concerned.
In Battersby vs. Kirk, 2 Bing. N. 0. 584, it was held that
Ireland was a place beyond seas, in regard to the Bristol dock acts,
as it had previously been decided under the statute of limitations.
In Davison vs. JHekibben, 6 Moore, 887, (S. 0. 8 Brod.- & B. 112),
it was held that a vessel engaged in general freighting between
Belfast and London, and which, at the time the question arose, was
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proceeding down the Thames from London, on her way to Belfast,
with a general cargo, was neither a "coasting vessel" nor "an Irish
trader, using the navigation of the river Thames as a coaster."
The statute of 6 Geo. IV., Chap. 107, declared that thereafter all
trade by sea from one part of the United Kingdom to another, or
from any part of the Isle of Man to another, should be deemed to
be coasting trade, in any matter relating to the trade or navigation
or revenue of the realm, and all ships while employed therein should
be deemed coasting ships. The customs act of 8 and 9 Vict., Chap.
86, § 113, contains the same provision. In Shepherd vs. Hfills, 32
Eng. L. & Eq. 533, it was held that vessels running between a port
in England and the Channel islands were not coasting vessels,
because, although subject to Great Britain, they were no part of
the realm, and were not within those acts. And where a vessel had
come from Calcutta to London, and there discharged her cargo, and
thence proceeded in ballast to Liverpool, it was held that the voyage
from London to Liverpool was not a coasting voyage within the
pilot acts. The reason why coasting vessels were exempted from
employing pilots, was because the masters, from their frequent
voyages, must become familiar with the navigation; and this reason
did not exist in favor of an East India ship.-The Agricola, 2 W.
Rob. 10. And having employed a pilot, the ship-owners were held
not liable for a collision happening while he was on board. In
Gatliffe vs. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314 (S. . Bourne vs. Gatliffe,
in Exch. Chain. 3 Man. &Gr. 642), where goods were shipped from
Dublin to London, and destroyed by fire after being landed on the
wharf, it was admitted in both courts that if the fire had happened
on board, the exemption of 26 Geo. III. would have applied to save
the owners from liability. The cause of action arose several years
after the Irish trade had been embraced within the coasting trade.
The only English case reported arising directly under the act of 26
Geo. III. is Morewood vs. Pollok, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 341, where
goods were burned upon a lighter in the harbor of Mobile, while in
transit from the shore to an English vessel. It was urged that the
lighter might be considered as constructively a part of the ship, and
that the goods might thus be deemed on board. The court, however,
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said "1It cannot be said that the lighter was a part of the ship at
the time. It belonged to other proprietors, and was employed for
the particular purpose of loading by the owners of the Barbara.
To bring a case within the act, the fire must, I think, be on board
the vessel which is the property of the owners, and that was not so
here. Again, the goods were not on board the ship of which the
defendants were the owners." And judgment was given for the
plaintiffs. This case leaves it somewhat in doubt whether, if the
goods had been on board of a lighter or shallop belonging to the
ship, they might not have been considered on board within the act.
The case of Johnson vs. Benson, 1 Brod. & B. 454, inclines that
way upon another class of liabilities under a bill of lading. Judge
Curtis in The Manufaeturing Co. vs. Bark Tangier, above referred
to, decided, in conformity with Morewood vs. rollok and Catliffe
vs. Bourne, that goods burned upon a wharf were not within the
act of Congress.
The whole current of decisions in the English courts tends to
show that the maritime business has always been regulated as
entirely distinct from any other, and that the immense traffic in the
narrow seas has not been allowed to be withdrawn from its proper
character as sea-going commerce. So far as the term "inland
navigation" is concerned in the English acts, no serious difficulty
could arise upon it. Every harbor in England is within the body
of a county, while all waters outside of harbors are parts of the high
seas, and under the jurisdiction of the admiralty. Lighters, barges,
and canal boats are all inland craft within all the definitions. The
writers on English commerce all treat of inland navigation as carried
on by small or light boats, and confined to rivers, canals, and
streams strictly land-guarded; and the decisions have invariably
coupled together the class of vessels, and their proper employment,
with the language of the acts of Parliament applicable to them.
The coasting trade is defined by statute to be a trade by sea, and
embraces now, as we have seen, much business that, before the new
laws, was actually foreign in legal contemplation. In the United
States it is equally regarded as an external sea-going trade, and
this not only by acts of Congress, but by courts; and is classed
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separately from all internal commerce.-See 2 Kent Cor. 599, 600;
10 Johns. 10, 11; Hastings vs. Pepper, 11 Pick. 41. See, also,
upon this subject, Web. Die. "Navigation-inland navigation;"
Rees' Cyc. "Inland Navigation," "Barge," "Craft ;" and also
"Lighter," "Barge," "Gabbert," in any marine dictionary.
The legal and popular sense of the term "inland," when applied
to navigation and commerce, differs somewhat from the geographical
term as applied to bodies of water. Geographers have classed
nearly all large bodies of water, except the great oceans, as "inland
seas." The Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the Baltic, are all included, geographically, within this class.-Mur.
Ene. of Geog. 188. The Baltic has been, in our day, claimed as
mare clausum under the Danish authorities, and most nations have
acquiesced in their claim of toll for entering it; yet no one would
regard its navigation as in any sense inland navigation. The
Mediterranean, and even the Adriatic, although geographically
inland, are not so commercially. And the old English claim that
all the narrow seas were close seas, and subject to British supremacy,
never removed them from admiralty jurisdiction, or regarded commerce on them as inland commerce. The high seas commenced at
low-water mark, or at the mouths of estuaries and harbors, and
nothing was inland that was beyond those lines.
It is very obvious that inasmuch as all harbors (except, perhaps,
open roads), are inland, the test of character could not be whether
a vessel merely entered inland waters in the course of its business,
but must be found in its general use. The object of the law being
to build up general maritime commerce, we have to look to that for
a criterion. The vessels not embraced by the terms of the act are
all of a class peculiarly adapted to inland carriage. They are boats
of burden unsuited to the open waters. Yet it might well happen
that large vessels may be employed at times in strictly inland commerc; and, if so, they would undoubtedly be held by their trade.
A general rule is necessary, and that rule is easily and simply
applied to the ordinary occupation. A vessel running from New
York to Boston is a sea-going vessel, although both her termini are
inland. A harbor lighter is not a sea-going vessel, although she
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nay, at times, be outside of the harbor. The English courts have
found no difficulty in making such applications of the law. Under
their pilot acts, the questions are of frequent occurrence. The case
of The Agricola, already referred to, and also the case of Hunter
vs. Me towan, are of this character. In Regina vs. Tibble, 80
Eng. L. & Eq. 372, the question whether a vessel came within the
Thames river acts, was made to depend upon her actual and habitual
employment, although the term "western barge" sought to be applied to her, did apply, in its popular sense, but not as the court
held, in its legal meaning. And in the United States District
Court for this District, the act of Congress exempting ferry boats
from the requirements applied to general passenger steamers, was
construed to exempt boats built and generally used as ferry boats,
although temporarily employed on a short trip off from the ferry
route, but in business quite similar to ferriage. It was held that
the law could not have been intended to require of boats upon short
routes, where passengers were on board but a brief time, and needed
no extensive accommodations, the same rules which governed
steamers which went on longer trips, and where there was need of
conveniences and safeguards.- U, S. vs. The Ottawa, 1 Newberry's
Adm. 536. A similar rule was applied to such boats in reference
to the registry and enrolling acts by the United States Court in
Missouri.- U. ,S. vs. The S. B. James Morrison, 1 Newberry's
Adm. 241; U. S. vs. Steam Ferry Boat William Pope, Ibid. 256.
There can never be any practical difficulty in determining whether
a boat is employed in inland navigation, when the character of that
navigation has been determined. In Wallis vs. Chesney, 4 Am.
Law Reg. 307, the District Court of Maryland declined jurisdiction
of a contract to carry coal on a canal boat, as not a maritime contract, because a large portion of the route was inland on a canal,
although forty miles of carriage was on tide-water. And other
cases will be referred to under another branch of the inquiry.
When an act is passed by Congress, modelled upon acts of Parliament, and containing similar qualifications, the rules which apply
to one should have some, if not a controlling force, in construing
the other. We have referred to the English statutes from which
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this law was taken, and we now propose to refer to the commercial
legislation and policy of this country, to aid us in determining the
legal intendment of our statute. These are safer guides than any
individual opinion.
The commerce of the lakes has been regulated by acts of Congress
from the outset of our history. Prior to 1831, navigation upon them
was regulated by the laws applicable on the seaboard; vessels being
registered for the foreign, and enrolled and licensed for the coasting
trade. In 1831, as the necessities of commerce had increased,
provision was made for special enrolments, which would permit
vessels to be engaged in either coasting or foreign trade; and no
registry was required. This, in no -wise altered the navigation laws,
otherwise than to favor lake navigation by opening the foreign trade
to enrolled vessels.-U. S. vs. The Margaret Yates, 22 Vt. 665.
In 1845, Congress, by statute, extended the jurisdiction of admiralty
over the lakes and their connecting waters-a jurisdiction intimated
by the United States Supreme Court to have existed without legislation, on account of the character of these waters.-Fitzhughvs.
Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443. The registry law, passed in 1850 by
Congress (9 U. S. Stat. 440), requiring transfers of United States'
vessels to be recorded in the custom houses, not only applied to lake
vessels, but has been held by this court to exclude State legislation
on the subject.-?obinson vs. Bice, 3 Mich. 235. The steamboat
inspection law of 1838, for preventing accidents on the water, was
made in express terms to require of lake steamers on the great lakes
the same safeguards prescribed on the ocean.-5 U. S. Stat. 305.
It is well known that the enactment of this law was procurred on
account of fatal accidents on Lake Erie. The steamboat law of
1852 is in terms a mere amendment of the law of 1838. The
passenger steamers on the lakes are by that law left on the same
footing with ocean steamers; while ferry boats, tug and tow boats,
and steamboats under one hundred and fifty tons employed on canals,
were exempted entirely from the operation of the statute, and river
steamboats of all sizes were partially exempted, being required to
have but one life boat.-10 U. S. Stat. 62.
In 1851, when the act to limit the responsibility of ship-owners
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was passed, the lake commerce had been placed by the prior legislation upon the same footing with that of the ocean. It had been
recognized as subject to the same dangers and partaking of the
same character. The loss of the Lexington by fire, on Long Island
Sound, and the decision of the Supreme Court on the liability of
her owners, in 6 How. 344, were the immediate occasion of its
passage. The peculiar interior position of the Sound had, as early
as 1795, caused a special enactment to be passed, exempting vessels
crossing from Long Island to Rhode Island from the rules applying
to vessels trading between districts not adjoining-a provision
similar to that which, in 1831, relieved lake commerce from the
like difficulties. We might well suppose that a law drawn up under
such circumstances to exonerate ship-owners would not stop short
of providing for all cases of the same character. After the broad
legislation regulating our lake trade, and considering its true character, which had certainly become somewhat prominent, we cannot
be warranted in holding that a statute applying or meant to apply
to the protected waters of the Sound, is inapplicable to the more
exposed navigation of the lakes, on the ground that such navigation
is inland, unless such a meaning is very clearly to be derived from
the terms of the act of Congress. Let us, therefore, see whether
there is any other, and, if so, what, inland navigation to which the
language is applicable.
It is very clear that wherec ommerce is confined exclusively to the
territory of a single State, Congress has no control over it. Gibbons
vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Milnor vs. NA.J. B. B. Co., Am. Law Reg.
Nov. 1857,Vol. 6, p. 6 . The great canals of New York, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and much interior river navigation, come
under the head of local and domestic commerce, and may well have
been intended in this exception. The business referred to by the
District Court of Missouri, in the cases cited, is of the same kind.
But we have also several large rivers which are not internal as far
as single States are concerned, and yet are inland in the sense of
being entirely sheltered by land within the Republic, and capable
of being navigated in safety by any description of boats or small
craft. We have many large and important harbors where hundreds
24
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of lighters, tugs, barges, and steamers of various sizes are plying
constantly in a purely inland service, but subservient to foreign
trade, or that between States. We have also in several places
canals entirely within single States, which are used to facilitate the
passage of rivers which pass through different States, to avoid rapids
and furnish means of continuous navigation. Some of these rivers
are on the borders of States, and divide them. Others are within
single States, but are used in commerce between different States.
The Ohio and the Mississippi are boundary streams; the Missouri
traverses one State, and bounds others; the Delaware, the Susquehanna, the Potomac, the Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers, and
several others, occupy similar positions; while most of the Hudson
and the whole of James river, and several other streams, such as the
Sacramento and many more, are within single States, and yet open
to commerce from tide-water. Upon all of these streams, there is
important commerce within the control of Congress, and laws have
been made expressly with reference to it. Canal boats have been
directly exempted from marine hospital taxes, and from the ordinary
fees for registry, enrolment, and license; and they cannot be
libelled for wages. This is the case, even when their terminus, and
a considerable portion of their passage, are in tide-waters. Buckley
vs. Brown, Brightly Dig. U. S. L. 805. Their crews are not
entitled to marine hospital relief. Ibid. The reason of this is very
obvious ; for, although within congressional jurisdiction, their employment is not maritime. Boats and lighters without masts, or, if
masted, not decked, employed in the harbor of any town or city,
are entirely exempted from the enrolment and license acts. 1 U.
S. Stat. 817, 818. It has been held that coal barges on the Monongahela river are not within admiralty jurisdiction. Jones vs.
Cincinnati Coal Co., 8 Am. Law Reg. 891. The steamboat inspection act does not, as has been stated, apply to tugs, or towing boats,
ferry boats, or canal steamers; and requires but a single life-boat
on the largest river steamers. And the act of Congress of 1845,
which extended admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes, and straits
between them, did not undertake to do so over even our largest
rivers. And whether courts have done so or not, the course of
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legislation has certainly distinguished them. And the decision in
the case of The Genesee Chief does not, in fact, settle any question
of jurisdiction on any waters but the lakes. In Jones vs. Cincinnati Coal Co. before cited, Judge Grier denies the applicability of
the doctrine to any but enrolled and licensed vessels anywhere, and
in reference to that case intimates very plainly that it was not
intended to reach river navigation.
When, therefore, after providing that "1the owners of any ship or
vessel" shall be free from liability on account of fire on board, not
occasioned by their design or neglect, the statute provides that
"this act shall not apply to the owners of any canal boat, bargel
or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in
rivers or inland navigation," we may properly look to the existing
legislation on such navigation, to determine the effect of the act.
And when we find all the vessels named have been exempted from
many of the duties and burdens common to other navigation, and
when, especially, we find such of them as are propelled by steam
exempted wholly or partially from the provisions devised to guard
against fire, there is good reason for excluding them from some of"
the privileges extended by Congress to other vessels. And there
is, in the character of the navigation itself, much to distinguish it
from lake or ocean service. There is no danger of foreign competition in such trade, unless in a very few frontier places, and notmuch there. The risks to vessels, with the one exception of fire,
are lighter, and when danger occurs, it is with less hazard of entire
destruction of the cargo. Danger from storms or wrecks on these
sheltered waters is comparatively trifling. The danger from fire isgreater, from the light construction of the boats, and the mode of'
stowage, upon rivers than upon open waters. The opportunities
for theft and embezzlement are infinitely greater where a safe landing can be made anywhere, and where stoppages occur every fewhours, if not every few miles. Upon the lakes, cargoes are more.
securely stowed, and are not so easily shifted or robbed. And'
while the characters and risks of the various kinds of business differso materially, there is another respect in which lake navigation.
greatly subserves our national policy. The merchant marine- has.
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been fostered in Great Britain and America not only for commercial,
but also for naval purposes. The mariners receive a training which
enables the nation to man its navy, in war, with competent seamen.
In this country, with a small navy, our merchant vessels, as well as
seamen, form important elements of strength. Not only on the
ocean, but also on the lakes, the same ships have been used effectively
for the double purposes of war and peace. Our lake trade employs
great numbers of able mariners, fitted for service in any ships, or
on any waters. Our river trade is mostly served by landsmen, or
boatmen who would rate as such on shipboard. Not only, therefore,
have we a large navigation, either inland or of an inland character,
which is subject to congressional regulation, and which may easily
satisfy the terms of the act, but it differs in most, if not in all
respects, as much from lake as it does from ocean business, both in
its public and in its private character and policy.
But lake navigation is not inland navigation in any sense. The
lakes are not within the borders of any State, and, except Lake
MKichigan, are not within the United States. But their border
character alone would not serve to make them maritime, or change
the scale of their commerce. It is their intrinsic nature, and not
their position alone, which characterizes their commerce; but their
position is also important in some views of national jurisdiction.
Our courts have long since learned to disregard the exploded notion
that there is any radical difference between salt and fresh water
commerce. The old rule of the English Admiralty, and its reason,
are clearly stated in the sea laws, in a treatise which is appended
to 2 Pet. Adm.: "In aqua dulci, a ship may become a deodand,
but in the sea, or in aqua salsa being an arm of the sea, though it
be in the body of the country, yet there can be no deodand of the
ship or any part of it, though anybody be drowned out of it, or
otherwise come by their death in the ship, because on such waters
ships and other vessels are subject to such dangers upon the raging
waves in respect of wind and tempest; and this diversity all our
ancient lawyers do agree in." p. lxxi. This reason is a sound one,
and does not depend upon the freshness of the water, but in England
generally or universally codxists with it. The perils which are
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referred to are as characteristic of the lakes as of the ocean. And
in The Genesee Chief Case, 12 How. 443, the Supreme Court,
referring to the act of Congress of 1845, extending the admiralty
jurisdiction over the lakes, say (p. 453): "If this law, therefore, is
constitutional, it must be supported on the ground that the lakes
and navigable waters connecting them are within the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as known and understood in the
United States when the Constitutionwas adopted. If the meaning
of these terms was now for the first time brought before this court
for consideration, there could, we think, be no hesitation in saying
that the lakes and their connecting waters were embraced in them.
These lakes are in truth inland seas. Different States border on
them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great and
growing commerce is carried on upon them between different States
and a foreign nation, which is subjeet to all the incidents and hazards
that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered
on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which existsfor
the grant of admiraltyjurisdiction to the General Government on
the Atlantic seas, applies with equal force to the lakes." And the
court very forcibly repudiates the supposed distinction between
fresh and salt water.
The true distinction between inland navigation and any other, as
we think, must be found in its character, as confined to narrow or
land-guarded internal waters, contradistinguished from that which
is maritime in its nature. This is the only distinction which can be
drawn from the English practice, it is the only one which distinguishes the real character of the various trades, and it is the only
one which has any real foundation in the risks and exigencies of
commerce. Judge Grier, in the case of Jones vs. Cincinnati Coal
Co., above cited, uses this language, referring to coal barges (that
case arising out of a collision between such vessels): "A remedy
in rem against such a vessel, either for its contracts or its torts,
would not only be worthless but ridiculous; and the application of
the maritime law to the cargo, and hands employed to navigate her,
would be equally so." "If it was unreasonable to refuse to ships
and steamboats on our great lakes and rivers the benefit of the
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remedies afforded by courts of admiralty, it may be equally so to
apply the principles and practice of the maritime law to everything
that floats on a fresh water stream. Every mode of remedy and
doctrine of the maritime law affecting ships and mariners, may be
justly applied to ships and steamboats, but could have no application
whatever to rafts and flat-boats."
If that is inland navigation which is carried on upon inland waters
in the geographical sense, we shall be led to strange results. These
lakes are classed by geographers, as well as courts and mariners, as
inland seas, and are not lakes at all in the proper geographical
sense, because they have a direct outlet to the ocean. 1 Mur.Enc.
of Geog. 188, 201 ; 3 Ibid. 350. Inland seas embrace, according
to the classification, the Baltic, North, and Mediterranean seas, the
Gulfs of Mexico and St. Lawrence, Hudson's Bay, and all other
bodies of water separated from the open ocean, and yet opening
into it. The Baltic, indeed, except during the prevalence of west
winds, is comparatively fresh, and all its saltness is derived by influx
from the ocean. The same remark is applicable, with still greater
force, to the Black Sea. The outlets of both are narrow, and controlled by single powers. But the inland waters of Europe are the
seat of an extended commerce, and the ocean is but the passage way
to reach it. The ports which, geographically, are on inland waters,
control the commerce of the world. The Atlantic ports of Europe
are comparatively insignificant beside them. And not only is this
so, but the whole admiralty law was formed and settled in those
waters. The Rhodian law, the tables of Amalfi, and the Consolato
del Mare, were the offspring and the guide of Mediterranean commerce, while the laws of Wisbuy and of the Hanse towns were
devised for the Baltic. The principles thus adopted, suggested by
the early exigencies of a commerce in those inland waters, which
was almost insignificant compared with the lake trade, have stood
the test of time throughout the whole civilized world, and every
admiralty code is founded upon them. A construction which would
make lake navigation inland navigation, simply because the lakes
are classed by geographers as inland waters, would apply with equal
force to those European waters which were the very cradle of marl-
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time power. And to do so, and yet leave the navigation of Long
Island Sound out of such a classification, would be to ignore every
principle of commercial usage.
Not only has the lake commerce been put upon a maritime footing
by the navigation laws, and by the decisions of courts, but it, in
point of fact, is in all respects as much so as that of the Baltic and
Mediterranean. The vessels used in its ordinary navigation are not
only capable of employment, but are actually employed, in transatlantic voyages, while some, at least, of the lake fleet were brought
over originally from Europe. For more than thirty years our
government has been striving to secure the free navigation of the
St. Lawrence, for the purpose of enabling lake vessels to communicate with the ocean free from the restrictions imposed on them by
the British laws. This privilege was claimed as a matter of right
by the Executive Department in 1826, and was placed upon the
ground that the right to navigate the lakes and the ocean gave a
corresponding claim to navigate their connecting waters. Mr. Clay,
then Secretary of State, insisted that if the St. Lawrence were regarded as a strait connecting navigable seas, as it ought properly
to be, there would be less controversy. And he then proceeds thus:
" The principle on which the right to navigate straits depends, is,
that they are accessorial to those seas which they unite, and the
right of navigating which is not exclusive, but common to all nations;
the right to navigate the seas, drawing after it that of passing the
straits. The United States and Great Britain have between them
the exclusive right of navigating the lakes. The St. Lawrence
connects them with the ocean. The right to navigate both (the
lakes and the ocean) includes that of passing from one to the other,
through the natural link." Corresp. of 1826, 33 Niles' Reg. 411,
et seq. Mr. Wheaton has expressed similar views on the right to
navigate straits (Wheat. Int. Law, 240, 250), and applied them to
the question of the Danish Sound dues-concerning the right to
which our government took the same ground which has b, en asserted
on the St. Lawrence. Both questions are now set at rest by treaty,
and our vessels have the right of passage to the ocean unmolested.
10 U. S, Stat. 1091, Reciprocity Treaty.
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The lake commerce being in fact maritime in its nature, and
having been thus recognized as such by all the departments of the
Federal Government, and regulated as such by Congress, we can
not hesitate so to consider it in construing the act in question. And
being satisfied that the inland navigation mentioned in the act can
not properly comprehend the maritime commerce of the lakes, we
are of the opinion that the plaintiff in error is not liable for the
property destroyed by fire on board of the propellor "Spaulding,"
such fire not having been caused by design or negligence; and that
the court below erred in charging the jury that the navigation of
the lakes was inland navigation within the meaning of the act of
Congress.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and a new
trial granted.
MIARTIN

Ch., J. and

CHIRISTIANcY, J., concurred.

cannot agree in the construction given to the act
of Congress by my brethren.
The words of a statute, when not used in a technical sense, are
to be understood in their ordinary and common acceptation. inland, means within land, or remote from the ocean ; and inland
navigation, that which is carried on within a country, on its rivers
or other bodies of water, without reference to their magnitude,
whether called lakes or seas, if such bodies of water are not so
connected with the ocean, in the commerce of the world, as to be
considered a part and parcel of the ocean, or highway of nations.
Large bodies of water, consisting of a chain of lakes lying hundreds
of miles inland, and hundreds of feet above the level of the ocean,
and in no way connected with it, except as their surplus waters are
discharged into it through a river that cannot be navigated by seagoing vessels its whole extent, it seems to me are to be considered
as inland waters, and the navigation of them as inland navigation,
in contradistinction to the navigation of the ocean, its estuaries, seas,
gulfs, and bays. Our lakes are sometimes called inland seas. Why
seas ?-Because of their magnitude. Why inland seas? Because
of their great distance inland from the ocean, and their disconnection
ith it; because the land, or bed of the lakes lying beneath the
MANNING J.-I
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water, is the property of a State, or nation, and, as a necessary
consequence, the water covering the land, which no other State has
a right to navigate without its permission.
It is admitted, the words "inland navigation," in their popular
sense, include the navigation of our lakes, but it is contended that
in the act in question the lakes are excluded, not in terms, but by
some supposed policy of the law not disclosed by the act itself, but
to be found somewhere, I suppose, floating in the hitherto unexplored
regions of judicial construction. I cannot recognize a rule of interpretation that allows the court, when in search of the policy of
a law, to go outside of the act itself. If Congress has failed, by
the act in question, to indicate the object it had in view, or to use
appropriate language to express what it intended, I doubt whether
the matter will be much bettered by any attempt of ours to improve
the work. The danger attending all such efforts is, they are too
apt to be prompted by a secret dissatisfaction with the law itself,
because it does not go far enough, and the exploration is entered
upon with a view to the collection of materials to amend it with;
and in search of these, no assignable limits are fixed within which
they are to be taken, and almost anything is pressed into the service
in a desperate case, and made to answer the purpose when nothing
better can be found.
I also doubt the power of Congress to legislate on the liability of
common carriers within one State; which is an additional reason
to what I have just stated for construing the statute as I do. The
sole object of the act is to change the common law liability of common carriers by ship or vessel. Congress has power to regulate
such liability on the ocean, but has it power to do it within a state?
If it has, may it not also regulate the liability of common carriers
by land, as well as by water ? Is there anything in the Constitution
of the United States, giving it power in one case, and not inthe
other? Within the States, Congress has no power to legislate on
any subject whatever, except so far as it is given by the Constitution
in express terms, or by necessary implication. The case is different
in regard to the ocean-the common property and highway of
nations. There, Congress may legislate on all subjects, touching
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the property and rights of our citizens, that any nation can, unless
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. On the ocean, the citizen
and his property are under the sole protection of the Federal Government and its laws. He is no longer within the limits of the
State of his nativity or adoption, or within reach of its sovereign
power and protection. There, and there only, is he under the sole
and exclusive protection of the Constitution and laws of the United
States. When on the ocean, in pursuit of gain, health, or pleasure,
the Federal Government is vested with plenary power for his protection, and it is with national pride he feels and knows his rights,
while he is there, are guarantied to him, not by the sovereign power
of a single State, but by the combined sovereignty of all the States.
But if Congress has power by statute to fix the liability of common
carriers by ship or vessel within a State, it must be under that
clause of the Constitutioii which authorizes it "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." I know of no other clause under which it can be
claimed, and it seems almost absurd to refer to this clause as
giving it.
To regulate commerce "among the several States" does not mean
to regulate commerce within a State or within the several States,
but to regulate the exchange or interchange of commodities between
States. Common carriers may be said to be aids to commerce, or
a means of carrying it on. So are bills of exchange and promissory
notes, and contracts of every description, where we use the word in
its broadest acceptation as meaning intercourse between individuals,
and do not confine it to the exchange of commodities. And when
used in this sense, in which it seems to be used in the Constitution,
it must still be understood in that instrument as referring to the
exchange of commodities between States, and not between the
citizens of a State. Any other construction, it seems to me, would
open a door to general legislation by Congress on almost every
subject within the State, which, if craftily used (and who can guard
against power), would, in process of time, annihilate State sovereignty, and bring about a consolidation of all power in the General
Government.
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The act does not purport to regulate commerce between the States.
But let us suppose that to be its object, and concede for a moment
Congress has power, in the regulation of such commerce, to legislate
on the liability of common carriers by water between Michigan and
Ohio, and to say to such carriers, You shall no longer be subject to
the laws of Michigan and Ohio as common carriers, though while
pursuing your occupation you are never out of their jurisdiction.
Would it be contended, Congress has the same power over the
liability of carriers confined to the waters of Michigan? If not, is
it reasonsble to suppose it intended by the act in question to create
a difference in the liability of the owners of ships and vessels navigating our lakes? Why should not the owner of a vessel sailing
between Toledo and Monroe, or from the latter place to Cleveland,
not be, liable to the same extent as the owner of a vessel sailing
from Monroe to Ontonagon, or from the latter place to St. Joseph?
Will it be claimed under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
given in the Constitution to the federal courts ? Can Congress,
under this grant of power, enact laws declaring what shall and what
shall not be the liability of our own citizens, navigating our own
waters? If so, about one-quarter of the State of Michigan, vhich
is covered with water, is virtually withdrawn from her jurisdiction,
and made subject to the uncontrolled legislation of Congress.
Rather than acknowledge such an encroachment on her sovereignty,
it would be better for the State to define anew her territorial limits,
excluding therefrom that portion of her territory which can no
longer be retained without constantly reminding her of her political
degradation, and the loss of her sovereignty over her own 'waters.
I cannot suppose Congress intended any such thing, and am therefore of opinion the exception in the act, of vessels "used in rivers
or inland navigation," was intended to include vessels navigating
our lakes. With this exception, I concur in the opinion of my
brother Campbell, and am of opinion the judgment of the court
below should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted.1
1We are indebted to the learned Reporter, T. M. Cooley, Esq, for this valuable
case.

It will be found in 1 Cooley's Rep.-Eds. Am. Law Register.

